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Abstract   
In August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced the unilateral suspension of the convertibility 
of the dollar into gold, a foundation of the world monetary system since the Second World 
War. The media and economic experts were caught by surprise, neither could foresee the 
immediate consequences of the decision or what would be the architecture of the emerging 
international monetary system. 
From 1971 to 1973, the money markets and the value of the dollar became a news, an 
opinion, an editorial item in both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. I examine 
this record to question how was anxiety about the dollar resolved in media communication? 
Media narratives were not uniform between and within the two newspapers. What 
distinguished the Times and the Journal's coverage was their diverse framing of the dollar as 
political, financial or economic object. I conclude that media uncertainty about the dollar was 




1. THE MEDIA PUBLISHING UNCERTAINTY 
The only politically relevant science is controversial science. Public debate is engaged by 
threats as diverse as monetary crisis and global warming. These threats are played out in the 
media as controversies, with opposing stands in polity and science. The subject of scrutiny is 
how to act to avert harm. But prior to these pragmatics, decisions must be made about which 
body of knowledge will interpret the facts and, in a democracy, how to weigh the claims of 
diverse groups.2 Policy is made on contested knowledge. Public debate is riddled by 
uncertainty. 
How risk is communicated to the public has been a major subject of study for sociologists and 
communication scholars.3 Some of this literature has zoomed in on the media’s 
misrepresentation of risk. An exemplary study of this kind addressed the 1989 scare when 
Alar, a growth regulator of apples, was suspected of being carcinogenic.4 Another apt subject 
was the Chernobyl disaster, with ethnographic work on how the public (sheep farmers in 
Cumbria, UK) accepted or rejected expert advice on the risk of fallout.5 More recently, 
                                          
2 Jasanoff, Sheila (2006), Designs on Nature: science and democracy in Europe and the 
United States. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; Friedman, S. M.; Dunwoody, S. 
and Rogers, C. L. (eds.) (1999), Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and 
Controversial Science. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
3 For a broad survey of the literature see Nelkin, Dorothy (1995), “Science Controversies – 
The Dynamics of Public Disputes in the United States” in Handbook of Science and 
Technology Studies, Jasanoff, Sheila; Markle, Gerald E.; Petersen, James C. and Pinch, 
Trevor (eds.), London: Sage. pp. 444-456. 
4 Friedman, Sharon M.; Villamil, Kara; Suriano, Robyn A. and Egolf, Brenda P. (1996), 
“Alar and Appples: Newspapers, risk and media responsibility”, Public Understanding of 
Science, 5: 1-20; Dunwoody, Sharon and Peters, H. P. (1992), “Mass Media Coverage of 
Technological and Environmental Risks: A survey of research in the United States and 
Germany”, Public Understanding of Science, 1: 199-230. 
5 Wynne, Brian (1992), “Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public 3 
 
scholars have turned to study “public engagement exercises” like the British Genetically 
Modified Food Debate.6 Overall, this literature compares assessment of risk differentially 
expressed between media, experts, and laymen, highlighting how strained their 
communication can be. 
Economic policy making is an apt setting to examine the management of uncertainty. The 
history of economic policy is punctuated by episodes of policy collapse leading to re-
examination of prevailing doctrine.7 The early 1970s capture one such instance of intense 
public debate, when the international monetary system underwent major restructuring. In 
August 15, 1971, without consulting his international partners, President Richard Nixon 
suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold. Over the next three months, bilateral and 
multilateral meetings were held between the main industrialized nations of the world, the 
Group of Ten.8 In December 1971 at the Smithsonian Institution, a new exchange rate was set 
between the dollar and other currencies. The new regime lasted for little more than a year. In 
March 1973, after a surprise devaluation of the dollar the month before, exchange rates were 
left to float. Control over exchange rates was forsaken as an instrument of national policy and 
as a stabilizer of money markets. 
                                                                                                                               
Uptake of Science”, Public Understanding of Science, 1: 281-304; Rowe, Gene; Frewer, 
Lynn; Sjoberg, Lennhart (2000), “Newspaper reporting of hazards in the UK and Sweden” 
Public Understanding of Science, 9: 59-78. 
6 Cook, Guy; Robbins, Peter T. and Petri, Elise (2006) “’Words of Mass Destruction’: British 
newspaper coverage of the genetically modified food debate, expert and non-expert 
reactions”, Public Understanding of Science, 15: 5-9. Jasanoff, Designs on Nature. 
7 Stein, Herbert (1994), Presidential Economics: the making of economic policy from 
Roosevelt to Clinton. 3rd rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research. 
8 The ten were: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, West 
Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Sweden. 4 
 
Briefly expressed the events of 1971-73 are uncontroversial. They have been examined to 
exhaustion in the secondary literature by economic historians and economists.9 But concealed 
in this settled past are the surprise of Nixon’s August 1971 policy overhaul and the anxiety 
over the unforeseen consequences of the monetary regimes proposed, adopted and abandoned 
in that short period. 
This essay studies the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal’s coverage of the debate 
on monetary reform. I focus on the newspaper media as a privileged source of information 
and interpretation on both science and policy.10 It is uncontroversial that politicians and 
experts consider the media as the channel to address the public. In the USA of the 1970s, the 
Times and the Journal were two of the most respected and widely read dailies.11  
                                          
9 To list a few notable titles: Solomon, Robert (1977), The International Monetary System, 
1945-1976. New York: Harper Row. Tew, Brian (1988 [1977]) The Evolution of the 
International Monetary System. London: Hutchinson; Bergsten, C. Fred. (1996), Dilemmas of 
the dollar: the economics and politics of United States international monetary policy. 2nd ed. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe; Britton, Andrew (2001), Monetary regimes of the twentieth 
century. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
10 Economics is by a large margin the most salient of the social sciences reported in the 
national media. See Weiss, Carol H. and Singer, Eleanor (1988), Reporting of Social Science 
in the National Media. New York: Russell Sage.  
11 For 1971, the same year it published the Pentagon Papers, The New York Times had a 
circulation of 908,462 daily and 1,468,944 on Sundays. The Wall Street Journal was the only 
national newspaper in 1971 and its circulation was at 1.3 million daily. Circulation (1971) 
American Newspaper Inc.; Dealy Jr., Francis X. (1993), The Power and the Money. New 
York: Birch Lane Press.  
The New York Times has been shown to have the largest volume of business and economic 
news of the generalist newspapers. Further, business news increased markedly in 1970-73 and 
again in 1978 when the Times created the section “The Business Day.” See Feldman, Howard 
D. and Aronoff, Craig E. (1980) “Trends in Newspaper Coverage of Business and Economics, 
1968-1978” Newspaper Research Journal 1(4) July: 54-65.  5 
 
The question I ask of this record is: how did the media manage uncertainty about the 
monetary crisis?  I am interested in highlighting how expert knowledge participated in the 
media's coverage. I begin this essay by showing that expertise on international monetary 
regimes was invisible circa 1971. I identify who were the burgeoning experts in the academic 
community, once identified I can search for their participation in the print media. The three 
sections that follow, the body of the essay, describe the media's narratives for: the late half of 
August 1971; the months leading to the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971; and 
February and March 1973. In each, I argue that narratives focused uncertainty upon a clear 
threat. Further, each narrative considered the dollar in one of its multiple cultural 
significations (treasure, source of pride, economic index). In way of conclusion, I examine 
differences between the two newspapers and its staff which may account for differences in 
their framing of the dollar crisis.  
 
2. WHO WERE THE EXPERTS? 
Milton Friedman is often credited with writing the seminal piece calling for exchange rate 
reform and for flexible exchange rates to be determined by private agents in the market. 
Friedman, writing in 1953, had full confidence that volatility in international money markets 
would be reduced under flexible rates and reasoned that rigid exchange rates were restrictive 
of trade, requiring “changes in reserves, internal prices and monetary conditions or direct 
controls over imports, exports.” To follow a fixed exchange policy was a hindrance to a 
sovereign fiscal and monetary policy. In policy, for Friedman, less control was better 
control.12 
                                          
12 Friedman, Milton (1953), "The case for flexible exchange rates" In Essays in positive 
economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 157-203. The essay however generated 
only moderate interest, besides reviews of the book only four papers in the 1950s mention 
Friedman's essay. Baumol, William J. (1957), "Speculation, Profitability, and Stability." The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 39(3): 263-271; Gehrels, Franz (1959) "Monetary 
Systems for the Common Market", The Journal of Finance 14(2): 312-321; Katz, Samuel I. 
(1954), "Exchange Flexibility and the Stability of Sterling", The American Economic Review 
44(1): 94-103; Tsiang, S. C. (1958), "A Theory of Foreign-Exchange Speculation under a 6 
 
Friedman's suggestions came in untroubled times. It was only in the 1960s that the 
international monetary arrangements came under strain. From 1964 to 1967, the British 
struggled to protect their exchange rate, finally devaluing by 14% in November 1967. In 1968 
a rush to draw gold led to creating a two tier system for its exchange. The private price of 
gold was determined in the City of London commodity markets, while its transaction between 
central banks was fixed at 35$ an ounce. Canada had from 1950 allowed its currency to be 
priced by the markets, it readopted a fixed rate in 1962 only to return to a float by June 1970. 
In May 1971, Germany and the Netherlands joined the float.13 Later that month, Austria and 
Switzerland revalued.14 The brief chronology underscores how monetary crises followed in 
succession and in increasing intensity up to 1971.  
The first concerted efforts to develop economic research on the subject of international 
monetary systems were contemporaneous to the early currency crises and the demands of 
international negotiation. In 1963, the IMF and the finance ministers of the Group of Ten 
commissioned reports examining reform proposals.15 At the press conference where the 
announcement was made, Edwin Dale Jr. of the Times asked Secretary of State Dillon if no 
academic economists were to be consulted. The response by Dillon angered the economists in 
attendance, he “claimed that economists could never agree, even among themselves, and 
could not therefore provide useful guidance on problems that should be discussed with the 
utmost discretion in closed meetings by responsible officials only.”16 Fritz Machlup at 
                                                                                                                               
Floating Exchange System", The Journal of Political Economy 66(5): 399-418. 
13 To hold the exchange rate, the Germans had been forced to purchase one billion in dollars 
on May 4 and another billion on the first hour of the next trading day. 
14 These events are well known, and have thoroughly examined in a number of publications, 
for reference see Solomon, Robert (1977), The international monetary system, 1945-1976: an 
insider's view. New York: Harper & Row. 
15 For summaries, see Daane, J. Dewey (1965), "The Report of the Group of Ten", The 
American Economic Review 55(1/2): 150-157; Polak, Jacques J. (1965), "The Report of the 
International Monetary Fund", The American Economic Review 55(1/2): 158-165. 
16 Triffin, Robert (1978), "The impact of the Bellagio Group on International Monetary 7 
 
Princeton took the leadership asking the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations to fund a series of 
academic conferences parallel to the government studies. The rationale was that since the 
“official inquiries were to be made exclusively by “government economists” and under rather 
restrictive mandates, a complementary study undertaken by nongovernmental economists 
without any constraints on the direction of their deliberations seemed desirable.” The likely 
result clearly set out by Machlup was to find “whether economists who have presented very 
different recommendations can still agree on a great many fundamental propositions.”17 
Machlup marketed “academics” as unbiased and unburdened to study monetary reform. A 
report published to coincide with the two official reports, was titled as the conclusions of a 
group of 32 economists, also called the G32 report. The economists unified statement was that 
a new reserve standard needed to be set up to supplement or replace gold and that more 
regular adjustments of exchange rates should be permitted. The economists disagreed with the 
official reports' minor and conservative proposals. However, the economists' consensus was a 
weak one. At a symposium at the American Economic Association meetings, the three reports 
were contrasted, and although no academic endorsed the official views there was also dissent 
from the G32 conclusions.18 
Out of the Machlup conferences came a continued effort by economists to intervene in 
debates over the reform of the wold monetary system. Machlup was joined by William Fellner 
and Robert Triffin from Yale University, with new Foundation grants. They became known as 
the “Bellagio Group” from its favored European setting, Villa Serbelloni, in Bellagio, a 
                                                                                                                               
Reform" In Breadth and depth in economics: Fritz Machlup--the man and his ideas, edited by 
Jacob S. Dreyer. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, pp. 145-158 
17 “International Finance Section, Annual Report, 1963-1964”, p. 2; Letter of Fritz Machlup 
to Robert V. Roosa, Under Secretary of the Treasury, October 18, 1963. From the files of 
Professor Fritz Machlup. 
18 Milton Gilbert found the Bellagio proposals unrepresentative of the economics profession, 
and offered a new weighting of the possible consensus. But the principal critic was Friedman 
highlighting the political dangers of relying on systems run by central bankers, unelected 
officials. Friedman, Milton; Bernstein, Edward M. and Gilbert, Milton (1965), "Discussion", 
The American Economic Review 55(1/2): 178-188.  8 
 
mansion owned by the Rockefeller Foundation overlooking Lake Cuomo in Italy. For the 
second round of conferences invitations were sent to “officials,” i.e. central bankers, IMF 
economists and finance ministry secretaries. Consequently, records of the conversation were 
no longer published. After a book of essays prepared for a first meeting in Zurich, no more 
joint publications were forthcoming.19 Machlup’s explanation was “to avoid speculations 
about official views of alternative policy measures.”20 In 1969 with the backing of Robert V. 
Roosa, Fred Bergsten, and George N. Halm the talks were further opened to “practitioners,” 
i.e. private bankers and corporate men dealing on the forward exchange market. For the first 
time, through the Wall Street Journal, the media took notice of what was happening.21  
At the organization of the meetings there was a concern in discriminating between the 
“academics,” the “officials,” and the “practitioners.” This was not always easy to do since 
many commuted between the domains. The Bellagio group was engaging in that familiar 
effort of attempting to enter the policy arena without losing an outsider identity which was 
ultimately the source of their authority.  
In its early years the Bellagio conferences' goal had been to foster professional consensus. It's 
later mandate was to supply officials with a scholarly insight into the monetary system. The 
Bellagio group meetings had admittedly no influence in the direction of policy. In this the 
“academics” and “official” participants and the policy analysts all agree.22 For my purposes, 
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the brief story of the Bellagio group underscores three important points. Firstly, it highlights 
how little development there was in the field of international monetary relations that it begged 
a strong institutional effort to produce relevant scholarship. Secondly, it testifies to 
economists' assumption that to inform policy was to engage with “officials,” the higher to 
middle level bureaucrats. Further and most importantly, Bellagio discriminates the experts. 
Figure 1 depicts a participant list of the “academics” attending the 1968-1972 meetings. We 
can observe a stable and select group (unsurprisingly mostly Americans and Canadians) 
composed of the organizers Machlup, Triffin, Fellner, joined by Robert Mundell, Walter 
Salant, Richard Cooper, Gottfried Haberler, and Harry Johnson.23  
 
                                                                                                                               
Emergence of Flexible Exchange Rates: An Analysis of Foreign Policy Change", 
International Organization 33(1): 57-81. 
23 Although not of immediate interest to my argument, the most regular european academic 
participants were Claudio Segre and Pascal Salin from France, Friedrich A. Lutz from 




Figure 1- “Academics” attendance of Bellagio conferences, 1969-1972. 11 
 
In the academic journals the Bellagio economists were the most prolific writers on the subject 
of international monetary arrangements. Interestingly, so were some of the “officials,” Marcus 
Fleming as deputy director of the IMF was the “official” that attended the most meetings.24 
The Bellagio meetings did lay the foundation for a consensus, a theoretical one instead of a 
policy one. It is illustrative to compare Anne O. Kruger's 1969 survey stating that “there is no 
“theory of international monetary economics.” (...) there are several related bodies of theory” 
each useful for a set of questions, with Peter Taylor's 1995 survey naming the work of 
Mundell and Fleming as the canonical model of exchange rate determination.25 As I examine 
the record of the Times and Journal's coverage of international monetary crisis I look to see if 
they identified the Bellagio experts, what use they made of their commentary and how they fit 
into the media's narratives. 
 
3. AUGUST 1971 - SURPRISE AND A THREAT TO OTHERS 
By early 1971, the existence of a “crisis” was well recognized in the media. The Times 
covering the May trials of the German mark was initially reassured that the origin of the 
convulsion was in other nation's currencies and economies. The interpretation was short lived 
giving way to the recognition that the source of the crisis was the structure of international 
arrangements. The asymmetric nature of the Bretton Woods system guaranteed that failures in 
US fiscal and monetary policy would be borne out by adjustments in other nations' exchange 
rates and monetary reserves. But there was no reason for alarm, reporters noted, since “the 
American economy is huge enough to be of great importance to them, but international 
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transactions are so small” that other nations could cause no harm to the United States even if 
they so wanted.26 
The second week of August 1971 began with headline news of a report by House of 
Representatives’ Henry Reuss, examining recent turmoil in the exchange markets. The report 
concluded that a devaluation of the dollar would help stabilize the markets and cut the trade 
deficit. Friedman made headlines by criticizing the committee's conclusions. He argued that a 
unilateral devaluation would be of little consequence without an effort of international 
negotiation. He reaffirmed his conviction that the free float of currencies was the ideal state of 
affairs and the future destination of the monetary system. Reuss, himself a participant in the 
Bellagio sessions was also criticized by another Bellagio regular, Robert Roosa, a former 
under-secretary of President Kennedy and a professional economist.27  
On Friday, the Journal’s front page collected the opinion of businessmen and economists 
about devaluation and “they say, come to think of it, it may not be a bad idea.” Although 
largely optimistic, the article closed with corporate executives confessing that “It is such a 
gosh awful complex thing that there’s no simple answer.” With similar concerns, the Times’s 
senior economic policy reporter commented that  
The United States … doesn’t know what to do. The Swiss National Bank doesn’t 
know what to do. The International Monetary Fund does not know what to do. 
Academic professors … frequently give an air of assurance, but they are sufficiently 
divided so that it can safely be said that they don’t know what to do. 
Dale’s list of “doesn’t know what to do” went on with Henry Reuss, Giscard D’Estaing, Karl 
Schiller, the Japanese and Dale himself.28  
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In this “time of great doubt” Nixon made a televised announcement, Sunday night, August 15 
1971. Nixon outlined a new policy blueprint to meet what he termed “the challenge of peace.” 
The new economic policy aimed at three goals: “create more and better jobs;” “stop the rise in 
the cost of living;” and “protect the dollar from the attacks of international money 
speculators.” Nixon noted that “in recent weeks, the speculators have been waging an all-out 
war on the American dollar.” Alongside a 90 day freeze on prices and wages, he suspended 
the convertibility of the dollar into gold and other reserve assets. Adding that “unfair 
exchange rates” were hurting the US trade balance, he imposed a 10% surcharge on imports 
to even out competition. Nixon’s tone was bellicose when charging that “time has come for 
exchange rates to be set straight and for the major nations to compete as equals. There is no 
longer any need for the United States to compete with one hand tied behind her back.”29 
The media reacted with justified surprise. Only a few days before, the Journal had been 
assured by the White House that no major economic policy shift was in the works. The day 
after Nixon’s speech, the Journal’s front page began with the complaint: “It wasn’t supposed 
to be like this in the Nixon Administration. (…) Newsmen could know they would never be 
called to the White House late on a balmy summer night to know about the newest thrust of 
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economic policy.”30 In contrast, the Times’s  first editorial impulse was to applaud the 
boldness of the President.31 
Despite being caught off-guard, the newspapers admirably filled in commentary and long 
articles for the front pages unpacking the new policy.32 The interviewed administration did 
not offer much insight into what lay ahead. The Times  noted “The change in the world 
monetary system … is entirely uncertain. That was the word used by Secretary of the 
Treasury John B. Connally. What matters most is exchange rates among currencies and Mr. 
Connally said he did not know what would happen.”33 Late night, on Sunday, both the Times 
and the Journal rushed to phone financiers, business leaders and economists to record their 
assessment. The Times found them supportive although insistent that the wage-price freeze 
and the import surcharge should be temporary. The Journal  saw it slightly different: 
“welcome for the tax credits, a wait-and-see attitude on wage-and-price controls, and 
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apprehension about the effect of closing, even part way, the gold window.”34 
Throughout the third week of August, economic players were queried about the new 
measures. The Times sought the American Importers Association that foresaw the surcharge 
on imports as “disastrous,” and the National Trade Council deemed it “disturbing and 
unnecessary” to correct the trade balance. The Journal queried the automobile and machine-
tool manufacturers who were pleased with the surcharge and the investment credits 
contemplated by the new policy mix.35 Along with these predictable reactions, there were the 
tales of stressed American tourists who on August 16 saw their dollars denied in European 
shops, and the worried travelers that stocked on foreign currency in anticipation of their trips 
abroad.36 
Academic economists’ commentary, with greater emphasis in the Times than in the Journal, 
was distinctively confident. Arthur Okun called Nixon’s actions “a leap forward” and Paul 
Samuelson “approved of everything in President Nixon’s package except his cutback of 
Federal Spending.” Samuelson, as the economist who “won the Nobel Prize last year for his 
economic theories and writings,” was invited to write a column on the Nixon program. 
Samuelson focused on the international aspects. He wrote that currencies would move from 
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“disequilibrium to equilibrium,” to the benefit of all trading parties.37  
Journalists also volunteered an interpretation of events. These writings summarized the 
collected commentary of economic player, politician and expert. Eileen Shanahan, a journalist 
for the Times’s Washington bureau considered that the consequences of inconvertibility 
“could not be harder to predict, simply because the step is so radical.” H. Erich Heinemann 
likened Nixon’s move as cutting the mythical Gordian knot, but cited Peter L. Bernstein 
worrying that it “created more long-run problems … than he appears to have solved in the 
short run.”38 Journalists were being cautious about the international issue. The Times’s 
economic specialists focused mainly on the inflation part of Nixon’s three target policy and 
the Washington bureau’s economic chief explained: “The international monetary matter is of 
great moment” but “come[s] behind the wage price problem in people’s lives.”39 
In contrast, the newspaper editorials were more adventurous. They shied from foretelling the 
future but did not hold back advice. The Times editorial writers made a principled defense of 
free trade and insisted that the import surcharge could only be justified in the very short run. 
They concurred with the experts (Samuelson) that the free floating currencies would find a 
new resting equilibrium and argued that “this country should press toward widening the 
permissible fluctuation around pegged exchange rates and a better system for future changes 
in parity among currencies.” The Journal's editorial of two days later agreed with the Times. 
Outlining a brief monetary history of the previous decades it called for the new monetary 
system to include “more flexibility than its predecessor.”40 
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In the mid-August commentary there was no alarm of impending danger. No one doubted the 
strength and soundness of the dollar or the US economy. “Confusion” and “anxiety” were 
words used only to describe European and Japanese reactions to the policy.41 The media's 
frame was of surprise at Nixon's condemning of the monetary system born at Bretton Woods. 
They found the same shock and puzzlement everywhere they looked. 
 
4. FALL 1971 - ASSIGNING BLAME AND THE THREAT OF TRADE WAR 
Intense negotiations followed Nixon’s announcement. The International Monetary Fund met 
in September 26. The Group of Ten gathered in London, September 15-16, in Rome, 
November 30 and December 1, and finally at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington DC 
on December 17-18, 1971. In between there were frantic bilateral meetings and consultations, 
decisively one between Nixon and French President Pompidou, mid-Atlantic at the Azores in 
early December. It was the difficulty to broker an international agreement that forced the 
media to reassess the stakes. The coverage of meetings flooded newspapers with scenarios: 
what would be the price of the dollar against other currencies? What reserve system would 
replace gold? Were exchange rates to be fixed or floating, or floating/fixed within wide 
bands? Interestingly, the commentary on these options was framed by a narrative on the guilt 
and innocence of international partners.  
In his August 15 speech, Nixon had named “international money speculators” the culprits of 
monetary instability.42 The Journal immediately undermined the suggestion. In editorial, it 
blamed public officials’ “attitudes” for creating lack of confidence in the monetary system. It 
argued that international cooperation was the requirement for monetary stability, which Nixon 
had imperiled with the import surcharge. A few days later, the Journal ran a front page piece 
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with a reporter visiting Corn Products Co., a wholesome food exporter, which as part of its 
standard operations used the forward currency markets.43 This “speculator” was an unlikely 
villain.44 
The Journal was faster than the Times in adopting a narrative of political blame. As early as 
August 18, its senior economic policy writer and the European correspondent wrote a front 
page feature addressing the terms of a negotiated settlement on exchange rates, new rules for 
fluctuations in exchange, and a new reserve or intergovernmental “money.” The focus was on 
bargaining terms between nation states.45 The Times noted: “While the issue seems technical, 
it is in fact highly political.” The Journal echoed: “the monetary problems may have so many 
political implications that mere technicians cannot solve them. Instead politicians may have to 
haggle on for quite a long time while the world awaits a workable monetary setup.”46 Only 
the sentiment distinguished the newspapers, the Journal seemed to lament an intrusion of 
politics, the Times took it as a given. 
The prospect of a confrontation between nations anticipated danger for the economy. The 
expressed anxiety was a return to the 1930s when “competitive devaluations, export subsidies 
and other “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies help trigger a world depression and kept it going by 
inhibiting trade.”47 The highlight of national and political arrogance turned the original 
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surprise into an identified threat: a world depression through trade war. 
The early candidate for blame was Japan. For two weeks after Nixon’s unilateral decision, the 
Japanese had resisted an upward valuation of the yen against the dollar. The Journal reported 
that “many Japanese businessmen believe that revaluation will force a badly needed 
reorganization of Japan’s industry,” however, the short-sighted government was committed to 
keeping a depressed rate. The Times seemingly addressing the government remarked that the 
Japanese “must recognize that a lasting improvement in its trade relations with the United 
States requires a further upward valuation.”48 
The Europeans were also criticized. In a mid-September editorial, the Journal remarked that: 
“The US is the big boy on the block and the Europeans would like to kick him a few times 
while they think they have the chance. … they insist that the US do at least part of the job by 
officially devaluing the dollar. … an open confession of financial error.” With this statement 
the Journal also dismissed the French and the Dutch proposals of creating a dual currency 
market (one for goods, one for finance) to dampen monetary movements. The European 
proposals were portrayed as insincere politicking.49 Since the dollar was the currency 
indexing all others, a devaluation of the dollar meant one of two possibilities: either an across 
the board repricing of all currencies, which was uncalled for, or a re-pricing of the dollar in 
gold, away from $35 an ounce. It was the symbolic significance of the latter that angered the 
Journal. 
The Journal was reluctant to represent the USA engaging in self-interested tactics to the same 
extent as other nations. But with time discomfort set in. Consistently, the Journal denounced 
the import surcharge as a poor example to set trade partners and an invitation to a spiral of 
protectionism. Late September, the Journal began to question the righteousness of the US 
position and argued: “Whoever was at fault for what happened in the past, the present need is 
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to prepare for the future.”50 By October, the Journal had accepted the accusation that the US 
was engaging in economic nationalism.51 
As the Journal  reported the political intrigue, its editorials became estranged from the 
dominant positions on offer. The Journal became opposed to the link to gold, while seeking to 
preserve the dollar's position of “leadership” in the monetary system.52  I t  b e c a m e  a n  
advocate of a free float. First in October, and insistently in December, the Journal argued that 
an “expert might set the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the British pound within, a 
broad range but anyone who claims he can set a precise figure at any moment, without help of 
the free market, is merely foolish.”53 
The  Journal’s editorial position was a defense of free trade, stated as: “Free Economic 
Competition isn’t an easy game to play. Approached intelligently, it is nonetheless a game at 
which every nation can win.”54 The Times also saw a game being played. Leonard Silk 
described a “poker game” between the Group of Ten and the USA bluffing its hand into an 
advantageous position. The Times reported how Treasury negotiators Secretary Connally and 
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under Secretary Volcker were using the import surcharge to bargain a new set of exchange 
rates, eliminate non-tariff restrictions on American exports and share the costs of US military 
presence overseas.55 
Compared to the Journal  the  Times  produced less editorial commentary about the 
negotiations, although equal amount of news.56 As a result, discussion about different 
monetary regimes was largely mute.57 The Times was also distinctive for taking a nearly 
moral stance about the problem and its resolution. They saw: 
The immediate objective for the United States must be to obtain a realignment of 
currencies that promises to restore equilibrium to its balance of payments – without 
forcing terms upon other nations that would be harmful to their employment, trade and 
payments positions. 
Therefore, the Times accepted the European demand that the US should devalue the dollar, 
which the Journal found so objectionable. The Times took the devaluation for granted. It 
justified that “the formal act of dollar devaluation will ease the adjustment problem for other 
nations and prove Americans willingness to cooperate in building the kind of new monetary 
system of more flexible exchange rates.”58 Unlike the Journal, the Times did not stake out 
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editorially the shape of a new monetary system, the immediate task was to realign currencies 
and reform would wait. 
Based on this record, my claim is that newspapers approached the monetary negotiations 
through a political narrative of national interests and national characters. Although they 
complained, particularly the Journal, that a technical problem was being polluted by political 
maneuvering, they used political reasoning to judge the alternatives. The Times advocated a 
swift devaluation of the dollar as requested by the Europeans because it saw the 
Administration engaged in imposing its will upon others. To the Journal all parties were 
engaged in despicable politics, and it blamed all in equal measure for the troubles of the 
monetary system. The Journal thus moved to an advocacy of a free floating exchange system, 
because it expelled the experts, the technicians and the politicians.  
The  Journal’s anger at the proposed re-pricing of gold and dollars was justified as an 
attempted humiliation of America by foreign powers. The dollar was a source of pride and the 
erosion of its price a national loss. The dollar bound to gold signified treasure and in the 1971 
narrative, also the leadership role of the USA in the world economy.  
On December 18, 1971, at the Smithsonian Institution, Nixon announced “the most important 
monetary agreement in the history of the world.” It was settled by the Group of Ten that: the 
official price of gold would become 38$ an ounce, from $35 an ounce prior to August 1971; 
new exchange rates were estimated to represent a devaluation of the dollar of about 10%; 
currencies would be permitted to float in wider bands of 2.25%. The monetary setup, 
however, remained largely unchanged and both newspapers found Nixon’s self-
congratulations excessive. The Journal editorialized “With all due respect to all concerned, 
we suggest that there is in reality scant occasion for pride and celebration.” It added, the 
devaluation was “a culmination of a record … of international financial irresponsibility.” The 
Times also found Nixon’s wording misleading, and stated “it remains to be seen how stable [a 
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system of inconvertible dollar standard] will be.”59 
Despite Nixon’s hyperbole, the newspapers were pleased by the Smithsonian agreement. The 
threat of protectionism and exchange war had been defused. The Journal remained hopeful 
for “even greater flexibility.” The Times called for continued negotiations “over many 
months, probably years” ahead. The identified threat of trade war had been averted. 
I have examined the early coverage of Nixon's 1971 policy overhaul and the Times' and the 
Journal's evaluation of the issues in the months that followed. Both newspapers called for 
flexibility in the money markets, both offered a political narrative of protagonists and events. 
What I have not yet done is to discuss if and how experts contributed to focus uncertainty 
about the dollar as a risk of political deadlock and escalating trade war.   
The Bellagio economists' channel to “officials” remained open in 1971. They met in 
Taormina, Italy, in January, and significantly they had a joint seminar in September 24, 
sponsored by the think tank American Enterprise Institute, before a meeting of the IMF.   
Three papers were published with the accompanying discussion. Armin Gutowksi was the one 
that approached the subject of reform to reveal a preference for a more flexible system against 
the close controls of the past. The absence of detail was conspicuous and suggests the careful 
staging of the events so that no details of actual policy be advanced.60  
During the negotiations, journalists on occasion reported economists' views. Of their policy 
brainstorming, that of Fred Bergsten, once adviser to the Nixon administration, received the 
most coverage by Dale at the Times. But characteristically the reporter did not endorse 
Bergsten, his blueprint was dubbed complex and difficult and ultimately of little relevance to 
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an agreement.61 Bergsten was newsworthy to Dale because he was a former staffer of Henry 
Kissinger and was testifying to Congress criticizing the Administration's handling of the 
negotiations. Bergsten also fit the media's “nations in battle” narrative. Bergsten worried 
about the advent of a “trade war” and the outcome of the monetary negotiations to 
international relations.62 
The economists also had un-mediated access to the newsprint.63 Robert Triffin had written in 
the Times in April 1971, diagnosing the collapse of a monetary system that compelled nations 
to take on unlimited amounts of US dollars to abide to the rules of the IMF. To Triffin the 
system was “bizarre” and unsustainable.64 Besides, economists did not file many columns on 
the international monetary crisis. At the heat of the controversy, Friedman, who was often 
cited authoritatively in editorials at the Journal, wrote a two part column for the Times, but 
focused mainly on the issue of wage-price controls staking government intervention of this 
sort as ”immoral.”65 
In the frame of nationalist self-interest and politicized bargaining there was seemingly no role 
for expertise. In October 1971, Leonard Silk's two part article on the money crisis, gave lavish 
                                          
61 Dale Jr., Edwin “Discussion Urged on Dollar's Role” NYT, June 24, 1971, p. 53; 
“Unthinkable thoughts” NYT, July 25, 1971, p. F5; “Murky Currency Situation” September 
12, 1971, p. F4. 
62 Dale Jr., Edwin “Rep. Reuss Asks Devalued Dollar” NYT, September 22, 1971, p. 1; 
“Everyone Is Angry at the US as IMF Talks Begin” NYT, September 26, 1971, p. F4; Janssen, 
Richard F. “Monetary Muddle” WSJ, September 26, 1971, p. 1; Silk, Leonard “Splitting of 
Blocs” NYT, October 13, 1971, p. 65, 70.  
63 Also occasional letters to the editor, Fellner in NYT, February 16, 1971, p. 32; Haberler, 
Gottfried in NYT, April 22, 1971, p. 40.  
64 Robert Triffin “Europe's Dollar Tea Party” NYT, May 14, 1971, p. 41;  
65 “Fears of Floating” WSJ, July 20, 1971, p. 10; “Premature fears” WSJ, July 25, 1971, p. 
14. Friedman, Milton “Morality and Controls I“ October 28, 1971, p. 41; “Morality and 
Controls II” October 29, 1971, p. 41. 25 
 
praise to Triffin as the economist that as far back as 1958 had foreseen the collapse of the 
gold-exchange system. Having shown the economists' prophetic insight and outlined their 
various proposals to replace gold and the dollar as the reserve currency, Silk concluded that: 
“Which route or combination of routes the world takes toward reform is a matter of politics 
more than economics.”66 Economists seemed to have a minor role to play in the political 
narrative.  
 
5. WINTER 1973 – SELF-DOUBT AND A COMPETITIVE THREAT 
On the eve of the Smithsonian agreement the Journal published an open letter by eighteen 
economists calling for the US government to maintain its “neutrality with respect to exchange 
rates,” the political term “neutrality” denoting a free market of exchange. The economists 
stated that the US could then unburden its domestic policies of the concern to balance 
international payments, the outcome would be greater trade.67  
Among the undersigned of the Wall Street Journal letter was Friedman. As a columnist for 
Newsweek, Friedman offered some commentary of the monetary crisis. In late May 1971, He 
had commented on the troubles with the mark, first arguing that the crisis of the German 
currency was not related to the dollar, and that the crisis and the floating of the mark had 
strengthened the world monetary system. Friedman was unequivocal in stating: “the sooner 
[the system] is replaced by floating exchange rates, the better.” Friedman penned the August 
16, 1971, column at Newsweek, with no time to react to Nixon's startling announcement, it 
was by coincidence that the subject of his column was gold. He wrote “The official price [$35 
an ounce] is wholly symbolic, and so is the monetary role of gold.” Friedman's commentary 
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on the Nixon policy for the latter half of 1971 and all of 1972 focused on fighting inflation 
and monitoring the growth of the US money supply. He only wrote about the international 
currency subject in December 1971 and July 1972. The first column overlapped with the 
Journal letter lamenting that “Secretary Connally and President Nixon will have snatched 
defeat from the jaws of victory” by agreeing on a new set of parities and a new price in gold 
instead of remaining in a free float. Half a year passed, and he dismissed public concern over 
the floating of the pound. The ideal international arrangement was a free float of all currencies 
and as soon as the “Smithsonian agreement is undermined the better.”68 Friedman was thus 
of a single mind on the matter of exchange rates, saying let the markets decide. 
The Times on its front page of December 22, 1971, published the “unanimous” protest of 
twelve economists to the “Smithsonian” accord. Economists warned that the agreement would 
not avert a new monetary crisis.  They called for new rules to allow “small and more 
frequent” adjustments of exchange rates, a much reduced role of gold, a move towards an 
international reserve currency, reductions in trade barriers and the uncoupling of financial 
negotiations with the US's desire to obtain “burden-sharing” for its military costs overseas.69 
These deliberative and consensual expressions of expertise, contradicting the dirty political 
arrangements, were newsworthy. Both newspapers echoed the experts calls for a continued 
discussion on restructuring the international monetary system.  
The Times invited Machlup and Triffin to expand on the subject. Machlup's column was an 
extended version of the twelve economists agreement stating that the Smithsonian wider 
variation bands for exchange rates were insufficient to avert crisis. Machlup explored the 
semantics of adjustment regimes: unalterable, jumping, gliding and no parities. He focused on 
a system of few but large changes in parities (jumping) and one of minor but frequent ones 
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(gliding, the boundary being bigger or smaller than 3%). This would enable a non-traumatic 
adjustment. To determine the moves, experts should look at the trends in the value of 
currencies to diagnose systemic changes to their position. With equal detail Triffin wrote 
about the reserve aspect of the system. He noted the massive flood of dollars between 1970 
and 1971, increasing total world reserves by 20%. This was a source of instability and a true 
world currency reserve should be adopted, and not gold. To Triffin, the IMF should become 
more active eliciting rate changes and managing the world reserves.70  
While the Fall 1971 negotiations were underway economists' arguments were buried, once the 
negotiations had been closed their opinion surfaced to comment on the limitations of the 
agreement and to outline a more reflected blueprint for the monetary system. Still, the 
newspapers lacking direct signs of market disorder allowed the issue to fade in the weeks and 
months ahead.71 When the pound was forced to float and suffered a substantial devaluation in 
late May, the newspapers paid attention. They also followed the IMF meetings in May and 
September although little progress came from them.72 Newsworthiness in 1972 was 
principally attached to the Presidential election and economic journalists were interested in 
changes to Nixon's economic team, as when Secretary of Treasury Connally was replaced by 
George Schultz.73  
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Turmoil in the monetary markets reemerged in February 1973, when a ten day run on the 
German Mark and the Japanese Yen signified the collapse of the Smithsonian parities.74 
Volcker made a world trip to negotiate a 10% devaluation of the dollar, and the Japanese 
agreed to let their currency float and appreciate.75 The unfolding of the Smithsonian accord 
in a bit over a year of existence was interpreted as proof against a fixed exchange regime. Silk 
wrote that “In a both theoretical and practical way, one of the major consequences of the 
current crisis appears to have been that it has blasted nations out of (...) their “theological” 
tendency to reiterate “par value, par value, par value.”” Private bankers and consultants were 
also reported to have increasingly abandoned trust in a fixed exchange regime.76 In fact, the 
newspapers were comforted by the temporary floating of the currencies, a Journal editorial 
noted that Americans should not rush into any new arrangements.77 The floating of 
currencies was no longer a state of distress, and even though Federal Reserve Chairman 
Arthur Burns called for the replacement of the float by a more managed system, the 
newspapers did not follow the urging.78 When six European countries agreed in mid March 
to align their currencies and allow them to float together against the dollar, there was 
unanimous cheer at the solution.79 
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The problem of institutional design was no longer the principal focus of the newspapers' 
coverage of the monetary crisis. A new puzzle had materialized: how to interpret the 
“weakness” of the dollar? For the Journal the weak dollar was the outcome of government 
blunders in the managing of fiscal and monetary policy.80 The Times took Nixon's cue, a new 
set of policy initiatives aimed at improving America's competitive position against Europe 
and Japan, that the dollar's loss of value denoted a eroding of America's economic 
dynamism.81 The subject of American competitiveness was a theme that interested the New 
York Times Magazine, editorially independent from the daily Times.  A South Asian 
correspondent wrote of an American popular abuse directed at the Japanese, “He gets blamed 
for being too aggressive, for getting up too early, working too late, for being the product of a 
culture that puts virtue in loyalty to both the company and the country.” Edwin Dale Jr. wrote 
to the magazine answering the question of whether the devaluation of the dollar reflected a 
loss of competitiveness of the US economy. He argued that the structure of the world 
economy had profoundly changed since World War II and “American industry and labor, we 
can now see, were the innocent victims of a monetary system that brought about an 
increasingly overpriced dollar.” He went on to say that having lasted this disadvantage, 
foreign business was allowed to set camp in the US market and would not abandon their share 
of the market. So for Dale, the weak dollar was an outcome of a past flawed monetary regime, 
and a weakened economy a casualty not a cause.82 The dollar is here represented as an index 
of economic dynamism, and in the context of a looming recession, a measure of American 
competitiveness. 
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The fundamental test to the new floating status quo that settled in “benign neglect” in March 
1973, was that it brought a recovery of the value of the dollar.83 It was the dollar as an index 
both of wealth and of economic competitiveness that had become the subject of concern and 
no longer the institutional make up of the international monetary system.  
Economists had something to do with this convincing, in the Winter of 1973 they were 
increasingly outspoken in the media calling for floating exchange. Silk reported on a 
Claremont Conference on International Monetary Reform joining some of the best known 
monetary economists. Silk was particularly struck by Haberler's argument that the monetary 
system despite the 1971-3 convulsions had not collapsed into bitter trade wars and 
bankruptcies, and was in fact quite sturdy. Silk was later confident in asserting that  
Floating exchange rates are distrusted and opposed by many businessmen, bankers and 
government officials as both symptom and aggravant of world monetary disorder. But 
many economists (...) have come to regard floating as not only a necessary but a 
desirable way to restore equilibrium to nations' balances of payments.84 
Economists also filed commentary in their own voice, to an extent that was more salient than 
in 1971. On the news of Volcker's negotiated devaluation in February, the Times called Fred 
Bergsten to write a column on the forthcoming negotiations. Bergsten looking at the US's 
proposal to the IMF of September 1972, underscored its political and economic shortcomings. 
But the assumption that the US was going to pursue that blueprint was flawed, and the 
prospect of the float became likely. Economists were brought in, again, after the event. 
Hendrik Houthakker wrote in the Journal on the 16th, Harry Johnson wrote in the Times on 
the 18th  of March. Their message was the same, floating rates are alright.85 Again, 
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economists were cast to play the part of reassuring the public not to fear economic change. 
 
6. JOURNALISTS MATTER 
The Times and the Journal advanced political narratives as the frame to decipher not only the 
international negotiations but also the nature of the money crisis. But there were also 
differences between the publications. Their representation of President Nixon was quite 
distinct, the Journal's instincts were to support him, the Times sought to undermine him. And 
although the newspapers shared a reluctance to publicize expert advice and to frame the crisis 
in scholarly terms, there were differences of degree with the Times adept of following experts 
and evoke their authority. 
Because the monetary crisis was a specialist subject, we can identify who were the journalists 
filing the reports and writing the editorials. The relevant names for the Wall Street Journal are 
Richard Janssen and Ray Vicker doing the reporting. While in the editorials, John E. Evans 
and Robert Bartley were in turn editorial page editors, and economic editorial writers were by 
Lindsey Clark and Jude Wanniski.  At the New York Times the senior economic policy 
specialist was Edwin Dale Jr., writing on similar subjects was Erich H. Heinemann. Thomas 
Mullaney was the financial editor and Leonard Silk a columnist writing on the economics 
profession. The Times editorial pages were headed by John B. Oakes and the economic 
editorials were written by Silk.  
The degree of journalistic autonomy differed between the publications and can be partly 
explained by longstanding editorial practices. The innovator that brought the Journal to its 
remarkable success in the 1950s and 1960s was Barney Kilgore. It was he who pioneered the 
feature articles, and the neat format of the Journal's front page. The feature items, like 
magazine pieces, often came days after the events but offered a wealth of research and 
analysis. Although a journalist filed the early drafts, the text was substantially edited by 
section and copy editors. In the news section of the Journal, due to this committee writing it is 
difficult to identify particular assumptions about the rule of expertise or other ideological 
commitments. In contrast, the Times had a more fragmented production of news. Although 
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editors directed reporters on what events to cover, senior reporters enjoyed substantial 
independence. Hence, we can be sure that veteran reporter Edwin Dale, Jr., at the Times, had 
control over what was published under his name,86 while the same may not be said of the 
Journal's Richard Jaansen. The other distinguishing aspect of the Journal, true to this day, is 
its separation of news and editorial pages.87 While journalists do not often write opinion, 
editorial writers concentrate and specialize on opinion. At the Times, in particular in this 
period, there was some unity between news, commentary and editorials, because Leonard Silk 
was writing the economic column one day and the editorial the next. With differing degrees 
and formats both publications empowered its staff to voice opinion and analysis. 
At the editorial page of the Journal, John E. Evans replaced in 1971 the famous Vermont 
Royster. Evans died suddenly in December that year, and was replaced by Royster's protegé, 
34 year old, Robert Bartley. This changed the editorial page mid way through the period 
studied here. Lindsey Clark who had been the economic editorials writer during Evans' tenure 
stayed only a few weeks.88 Clark had a masters in economics from the University of Chicago 
and is credited to have converted the editorial page to monetarism. He was replaced by the 
scandalous Jude Wanniski, who was previously writing about Washington and politics. The 
saga of Wanniski's relationship with economic doctrine and government policy has been a 
subject of passionate scrutiny. Wanniski had a close relationship with a maverick economist, 
Arthur Laffer, and to his own admission would confer with him daily on the phone about all 
subjects economic.89 This relationship deepened in the mid-1970s when Wanniski became a 
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propagandist of the policy views of Laffer and Robert Mundell, later labeled “Supply Side 
Economics,” and adopted by Ronald Reagan in his campaign to the Presidency.90 Wanniski 
recalls having heard of and met Mundell in 1974, and only then did he adopt Mundell's 
prescription of a return to the gold standard. In 1972-3, Wanniski's close relationship with 
Laffer, nurtured an estrangement with the economics profession, and its public authority. 
Conversely, at the Times there was sympathy for economists' expertise thanks due to Silk. A 
PhD in Economics, Silk began a journalism career in 1954 at Business Week, rising to become 
editorial page writer along with the honorary charge of Chairman of the editorial board. When 
in 1969 Business Week chose a new managing editor, a position Silk hoped for, he left for the 
Brookings Institution to work as an economist. He was soon invited to join the Times' 
editorial page. Silk is known as a pioneer of economics as news.91 While at the Times, he 
wrote extensively on the economics profession including several books for the mass public.92 
The contrast between Bartley-Wanniski vs Silk, denotes two very different commitments 
towards expert advice. The former were outsiders to economics, who saw economists as 
bureaucrats. Silk was an insider that had stepped out and was much more willing to grant 
respect and attention. Further, these preferences were embraced by distinct political 
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commitments, ones conservative, the other liberal.  
The reporting of Edwin Dale Jr., is also instructive. Dale was reluctant to embrace expert 
advice. He reported it with misgivings. His stated objection was that economists could never 
agree. When in December 1971, groups of economists signed joint letters of protest against 
the Smithsonian agreement, in apparent unanimity, Dale was eager to print their views. 
Unlike Silk, Dale lacked the self-assurance of a training in economics and a familiarity with 
its language and practices, and looked for unanimity as a sign of scientific certification. His 
“beat” was politics and often preferred to quote the views of former government economists, 
as the case of C. Fred Bergsten, over the academics.  
Beside the private assumptions, made up of the journalists' education, “beat,” or ideology, 
there was circa 1971 a wider cultural malaise combating expert knowledge. Economic 
journalists do not often reflect on their trade, but one such rare instance was provided in 
December 1971, at the American Economic Association Meetings in New Orleans. In a 
session jointly hosted by Walter Heller and Leonard Silk, “Economists consider Journalists 
and vice versa”, the invited journalists were Silk, Janseen of the Wall Street Journal and 
Bernard Nossiter of the Washington Post. The purpose was to reflect on how experts and 
reporters have interacted and how their conversation might be improved. Given contemporary 
policy controversy, both Silk and Janseen shared the concern for how government economists 
were turning into advocates. Economists feuding was highlighted as a reason to demote 
professional opinion about economic matters. Janseen stated:  
Reasonable men can and differ on [matters of policy], and economists seem to differ at 
least as much as other reasonable men – enough so that it isn’t reasonable for an 
economist to expect his views on the economy to be treated as the last word simply 
because he is an economist.93 
Silk was even more severe. Addressing the Johnson and Nixon administrations, he offered 
instances of economists doctoring the numbers for partisan motives, while colleagues were 
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“muzzled” for trying to speak against the official party line.94 Overall, these statements 
denote a general discredit of expert advice among the journalists in the early 1970s.95 
The patchwork of newspaper reporting is sewed with these threads. There is the dominance of 
political reporting guiding journalists’ coverage of economic controversy. There is the theme 
of distrust in expert advice favoring a narrative of political prejudices and manipulations. 
There are the editorial strictures of the publications leaving greater or lesser autonomy to its 
reporters. There are the particular beats of each journalist, their training and their ideological 
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" ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿. ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿5+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
4 ￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7 8 ￿ ￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7 8 ￿ ￿￿￿￿; ￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿7 8 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5+ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
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￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
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/ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ￿￿51￿2 ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿4 ￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 3 ￿
( ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿ 6 2 ￿￿￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
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￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿5& ￿￿9 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿? ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿9 ￿￿￿￿4 ￿ ￿- ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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￿￿￿￿) 3￿ " ￿ # ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿5￿ , ￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿* ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿   ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿5- ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿   ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
8 - ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ - ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿. - ￿: ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿% - ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿. ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿￿2 - " ; ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ - ￿ - ￿
. ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿5$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿￿￿  * /, ￿￿
￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿2 ￿   ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿
￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ - ￿￿- ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5+ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿4 ￿( ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿2 ￿   ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, ! ￿
2 ￿   < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ # ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ’ ￿ 6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ’ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿ >￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5. ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿G ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿4 ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ?   ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿- ￿￿- ￿% ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿: ’ @ ￿￿￿ ￿ 6A ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" - ￿￿ - ￿￿ - ￿% ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿5￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ’ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿, ) ￿
% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" - ￿￿ - ￿￿ - ￿% ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿- ￿￿- ￿% ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿5￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿H ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, , ￿
+ ’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ’ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ; ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿5￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
( ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿1￿3 ￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, 1 ￿
5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿- ￿￿- ￿% ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿5￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
  ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C ￿ D ￿￿5 ￿ ’ 6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5- ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿- ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿
* ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, 3￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" - ￿￿ - ￿8 ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿
￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿4 2 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ I ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿H ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿J ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿
" ￿   E ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿" ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿
$ ￿   ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ? ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: F ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ 6￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ’ ￿ ￿￿￿5+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +   ￿K C ￿￿￿4 ￿
￿ +   ￿K B ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿5+ ￿￿￿6 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿ & ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿1 ! ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" # ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ & ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+ ’ ￿ ￿" - ￿% - ￿￿ - ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿5( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿ & ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ( ￿
￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿1 ) ￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿" ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5+ ￿* ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿ ! ￿
￿￿￿￿1 , ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ - ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿5( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿4 2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿1 1 ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" - ￿￿ - ￿8 ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿J ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿J ￿￿￿4 ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿3 ￿+ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿- ￿￿ ￿4 ￿￿ ￿￿
L ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿
G ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ 6￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" - ￿￿ - ￿8 ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5  ￿￿￿ ￿2 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿1 3￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿   ￿￿5, ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5. ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿G ￿￿
4 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿J ￿￿ ￿ ?   ￿ 6& ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " - ￿ ￿ - ￿ 8 ￿ ￿ 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 5￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿2 ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
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